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INTRODUCTION
Private lawmaking is an ordinary rent-seeking activity of interest
groups: the pursuit of self-interest through regulation. Familiar examples of private lawmakers include the National Rifle Association
(NRA), the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and
the National Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). Motivated private lawmakers take advantage of imperfections in the
marketplace of ideas and utilize such imperfections to obscure their
visibility. The US Supreme Court's marketplace of ideas theory' denies market imperfections and presumes prefect competition in the
marketplace. This presumption rests on the Court's firm premise
that the pursuit of self-interest necessarily serves the public. Resting
on this unqualified confidence in the pursuit of self-interest, in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission2 the Supreme Court has
empowered interest groups, strengthening their influence over public
lawmakers. This Essay describes how the Supreme Court's confidence in the inherent value of the pursuit of self-interest has weakened democratic institutions, arming interest groups with effective
means to draft the law of the land, while circumventing the public
discourse and shortcutting open debates.

I. WHO WRITES OUR LAWS?
Our elected legislators debate and pass laws. They draft many
bills but routinely also adopt "bills" that private parties write for
them. Private lawmakers write many of our laws. In some instances,
elected lawmakers ("public lawmakers") revise these privately drafted bills, but in many instances, they are adopted verbatim. The influ-

t Professor of Law, the University of Arizona College of Law. This Essay is part of a
large project on regulation that includes several papers and a casebook, Regulation: Why and
How the State Regulates (Foundation 2012).
1 See, for example, New York State Board of Elections v Lopez Torres, 552 US 196, 208
(2008); Hustler Magazine, Inc v Falwell, 485 US 46, 52 (1988); Red Lion Broadcasting Co v
FCC, 395 US 367,390 (1969).
2
130 S Ct 876 (2010).
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ence of private lawmaking on the legislative landscape, most noticeably at the state level, is profound.
Private lawmaking in America is not a new phenomenon,3 nor is
it an unstudied one. 4 Scholars, however, have described the level of
study as "inattention" 5 and have argued that "privately made laws
result 6from an undemocratic but potentially market-disciplined process."
Not all private lawmakers are created equal. Some private lawmakers are apolitical organizations that are not affiliated with specific interest groups. They work to clarify, modernize, and improve the
law, while maintaining some level of transparency regarding their
processes. The American Law Institute (ALI), for example, is a prestigious legal organization whose members include about four thousand lawyers, judges, and academics. ALI is best known for promulgating restatements of law.7 Similarly, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is comprised of
state commissions on uniform laws from each state and since 1892
has been providing states with model legislation designed to increase
uniformity and clarity in state lawi The general purpose of these organizations is to overcome imperfections in the marketplace of ideas.
Another type of private lawmakers-Interested Private Lawmakers (IPLs) - are legislative arms of interest groups. They engage
in ordinary rent-seeking activity: the pursuit of self-interest through
regulation. 9 Motivated private lawmaking is rather common. For example, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) persuaded Congress, forty-one states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico to adopt its anticamcorder model law that criminalizes
3
See Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Harv L Rev 201, 202 (1937);
Frederic Jesup Stimson, Uniform State Legislation,5 Annals Am Academy Polit & Soc Science
1,11 (1895).
4
See, for example, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U Pa L Rev 595, 607-37 (1995); David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64
Ohio St L J 371, 404 (2003). See also Editorial, The Big Money Behind State Laws, NY Times
A22 (Feb 13, 2012); Anita Kumar, Ghostwriter at Work for Virginia's Assembly?, Wash Post
B1 (Dec 28, 2011).
5
Schwartz and Scott, 143 U Pa L Rev at 597 (cited in note 4).
6
Snyder, 64 Ohio St L J at 373-74 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added). See also Gillian
Hadfield and Eric Talley, On Public versus PrivateProvision of CorporateLaw, 22 J L Econ &
Org 414,436 (2006).
7 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 Geo
Wash L Rev 1212, 1216 (1993).
8 See Walter P. Armstrong Jr, A Century of Service: A CentennialHistory of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 11-22 (West 1991).
9 For more on interest group lobbying, see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q J Econ 371, 376-81 (1983); Richard A.
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 335, 344 (1974); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3,13-17 (1971).
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copyright violations and imposes harsh imprisonment penalties.' 0
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a dominant
IPL, describes itself as a "non-profit, nonpartisan association of over
2,000 state legislators that works to promote principles of free markets, limited government and federalism throughout the states.""
Founded in 1973,
ALEC's Task Forces have considered, written and approved
hundreds of model bills on a wide range of issues, model legislation that will frame the debate today and far into the future.
Each year, close to 1,000 bills, based at least in part on ALEC
Model Legislation, are introduced
in the states. Of these, an av12
erage of 20 percent become law.
ALEC's 2010 Legislative Scorecard proudly announces that, during
2009 alone, states enacted 115 "ALEC bills," which constituted a 14percent "enactment rate" (a total of 826 ALEC bills were introduced
in statehouses). 3
The National Rifle Association's Institute for Legislative Action
(NRA-ILA), another IPL, is the NRA's lobbying arm. NRA-ILA is
"committed to preserving the right of all law-abiding individuals to
purchase, possess and use firearms for legitimate purposes as guaranteed by the Second Amendment.' ' 14 The organization drafts model
laws, such as "stand your ground" statutes, and takes credit for
I0 See Susan Crabtree and Paul Sweeting, Feds Pushing Play, Daily Variety 8 (Apr 26,
2004); Eric J. Schwartz, In the Matter of Preregistrationof Certain Unpublished Copyright
Claims-Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Comments of the Motion Picture Association of
American to David Carson, Esq 1-2 (Aug 22, 2005), online at http://www.copyright.gov/prereg/
comments/mpaa.pdf (visited Dec 18, 2012). For the enacted federal version of the law, see
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 § 102, Pub L No 109-9, 119 Stat 218, 218-20,
codified at 18 USC § 2319B.
11 Kaitlyn Buss, Hundreds of State Legislators Will Meet in Phoenix to Discuss Solutions
for Creating.lobs, Growing the Economy and Restoring Fiscal Order (ALEC Nov 28, 2011),
online
at
http://www.alec.org/2011/11/hundreds-of-state-legislators-to-meet-in-phoenixdiscussing-solutions-for-creating-jobs-growing-the-economy-and-restoring-fiscal-order (visited
Dec 18, 2012).
12 History (ALEC), online at http://www.alec.org/about-alec/history (visited Dec 18, 2012).
13 2010 Legislative Scorecard (ALEC), online at http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/
%7Bfb3cl7e2-cddl-4df6-92be-bd4429893665%7D/9-LegislativeScorecardo202010.pdf (visited Dec
18, 2012). For more on ALEC, see ALEC: Ghostwriting Law for CorporateAmerica (American
Association for Justice May 2010), online at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/ustice/
ALECReport.pdf (visited Dec 18, 2012); CorporateAmerica's Trojan Horse in the States: The
Untold Story behind the American Legislative Exchange Council (Defenders of Wildlife and
National Resources Defense Council 2002), online at http://www.alecwatch.org/
11223344.pdf (visited Dec 18, 2012).
14 About NRA-ILA (NRA), online at http://www.nraila.org/about-nra-ila.aspx (visited
Dec 18, 2012).
15 See Denise M. Drake, Comment, The Castle Doctrine: An Expanding Right to Stand
Your Ground, 39 St Mary's L J 573, 575 (2008); P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrificationof
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"help[ing] pass" laws, such as the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, "which blocks reckless lawsuits against firearms manufacturers [and distributors].' ' 16 NRA-ILA considers "[1legislative action...
17

a constant war, fought on multiple battlefields simultaneously.'

A less familiar IPL is Gary Marbut of Missoula, Montana, who

"takes credit for the drafting of over thirty pro-gun and pro-hunting
Montana laws."' 18 Mr. Marbut's most successful legislative product,
the Firearms Freedom Act, was introduced in thirty states and
adopted in eight. 19 To advance his goals, Mr. Marbut founded the

Montana Shooting Sports Association, a political action organization
20

affiliated with the NRA, "to get the right candidates elected.,
Indeed, the role of IPLs is so entrenched in our legislative cul-

ture that a statute's informal name often indicates its private origins.
For example, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
199821 was commonly referred to as the "the Mickey Mouse Protection Act" for Disney's part in its enactment.22 The Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009,23 which reformed to-

bacco regulation in the United States while preserving some of Philip
Morris's interests, was labeled the Marlboro Act, in acknowledgment
24
of the company's extensive involvement in its drafting.

Self-Defense by NationalRifle Association-InspiredStatutes: From the Doctrineof Retreat to the
Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S U L Rev 1, 23 (2007).
16 The NRA Institute for Legislative Action: Protecting our Second Amendment Freedom
and Hunting Heritage (NRA-ILA Mar 9, 2008), online at http://www.nraila.org/newsissues/articles/2008/nra-ila. aspx?s-which+blocks+reckless+lawsuits+against+firearms+
manufacturers&st-&ps- (visited Dec 18, 2012).
17

Id.

Barak Y. Orbach, Kathleen S. Callahan, and Lisa M. Lindemenn, Arming States'
Rights: Federalism,Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 Ariz L Rev 1161,
1176 (2010).
19 See id at 1178.
20 Orbach, Callahan, and Lindemenn, 52 Ariz L Rev at 1176 (cited in note 19), quoting
Jess Bravin, A Lone Stance on Ad Spending: Montana is Seeking to Uphold Campaign-Funding
Curbs Jeopardized by a Supreme Court Ruling (Wall St J Oct 12, 2010), online at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704127904575543920682786784.html
(visited
Dec 18, 2012).
21 Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827, codified in various sections of Title 17.
22 See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L Rev 1057, 1065
18

(2001).
23 Pub L No 111-31, 123 Stat 1776, codified at 21 USC § 387 et seq.

24 The person who coined the name is Steve Watson, a former Vice President of External
Affairs of Lorillard, one of the largest four tobacco companies. John Carey, Commentary: Philip Morris' Latest Smoke Screen (Bloomberg Businessweek July 15, 2001), online at
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-07-15/commentary-philip-morris-latest-smoke-screen
(visited Dec 18, 2012). See also Allan M. Brandt, FDA Regulation of Tobacco - Pitfalls and
Possibilities,359 New Eng J Med 445, 447 (2008).
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II. THE VISIBILITY OF IPLs
Of course, there is no reliable data about the scope of IPLs' activities and influence. By and large, interested private lawmaking is
relatively invisible. Being opportunistic by definition,25 IPLs disclose
information selectively and try to manipulate publicly available information.
Benefiting from "inattention," IPLs receive the constitutional
protection available to interest groups, under the Supreme Court's
premise that, in the marketplace of ideas, the pursuit of self-interest
tends to serve society, namely, that when interest groups exercise political speech they are likely promote societal ends.
In Citizens United, the Court held that the First Amendment
prohibited the government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporations. 26 The Court was divided about the question whether the pursuit of self-interest by pressure groups is likely
to serve as a means to hold officials accountable to the people or as a
means to discipline and reward officials for their accountability to
private interests at the expense of the people. A majority of five justices sided with the former theory. Writing for the majority, Justice
Anthony Kennedy ruled that speech necessarily serves as a "means
to hold officials accountable to the people," 27 and declared that
"[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against ... restrictions distinguishing among different
28
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.,
In June 2012, the Supreme Court handed down three decisions
that underscored the increasing aggressiveness of IPLs in our political system, including their willingness to engage in conflict with public lawmakers: National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius 29 ("NFIB"), Arizona v United States30 ("Arizona"),
and

25 Professor Oliver Williamson provided the classic definition of "opportunism" as "selfinterest seeking with guile." Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization, 26 (Free Press 1975).
This definition stresses the interest of opportunist parties in control over information. Professor Henry Smith offered a more elaborate definition that stresses the significance of information: "[B]ehavior that is undesirable but that cannot be cost-effectively captured -defined,
detected, and deterred-by explicit ex ante rulemaking." Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law versus Equity *9
(unpublished manuscript, 2010), online
at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmithLawVersusEquity7.pdf (visited Dec 18,

2012).
26
27
28
29

30
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American Tradition Partnership,Inc v Bullock3 ("ATP"). In NFIB,

twenty-six states, several individuals, and the National Federation of
Independent Business challenged the constitutionality of two key

provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010.32 IPLs designed the intellectual framework underlying the constitutional challenges and provided state legislatures with model bills
that nullified the federal statute.33 In Arizona, the Court upheld sev-

eral key provisions of a state immigration law that conflicted with
federal immigration policies. 3 4 An IPL crafted and championed the
state law.35 A TP involved a constitutional challenge to Montana's
1912 Corrupt Practices Act.3 6 The petitioners were IPLs that relied
on Citizens United to challenge the 1912 statute that imposed re-

strictions on their activities.3 7 By a 5-4 vote, the Court declined to reconsider Citizens United, delivering a victory to IPLs that sought to

influence elections.3 8 One of the petitioners was Marbut's Montana
Shooting Sports Association.3 9
Under Citizens United's public accountability theory, the increasing trend in IPL assertiveness could only illustrate good citizen-

ship-a critique of the government through impacting regulation.
Under this premise, because the pursuit of self-interest serves society, the activities of interest groups, including IPLs, are also likely to

serve society, while governmental intervention in market activities
and individual choices is likely to be harmful.
But even the "tradition of economic liberalism ...has always as-

sumed that there were some economic results which cannot be attained at all or attained only in inappropriate amounts if left to the

31 132 S Ct 2490 (2012).
See NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2580.
33 See Beth Kutscher, 'Model Legislation': States, ALEC Take Reform into Their Own
Hands, 42 Mod Healthcare 14, 14-15 (June 18, 2012). For an example of one of the statutes
mentioned in Kutscher, see Virginia Healthcare Freedom Act, 2010 Va Acts 106, codified at
Va Code § 38.2-3430.1:1. See also Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional,5 NYU J L & Liberty 581, 607-08
32

(2010).
34 See Arizona, 132

S Ct at 2502, 2504, 2506.
35 See Fred Grimm, Private Prisons the Force behind Immigrant Law?, Miami Herald
(Nov 16, 2010). For more on the Arizona immigration law, see Gabriel J. Chin and Marc L.
Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration through Criminal Law, 61
Duke L J 251, 291-95 (2011).
36 See ATP, 132S Ct at 2491.
37 See Marnee Banks, Montana Politics 2010: Corporate Spending Ruling (KXLH Dec
27, 2010), online at http://www.kxlh.com/news/montana-politics-2010-corporate-spendingruling (visited Dec 18, 2012).
38 See ATP, 132S Ct at 2491.
39 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, American Tradition Partnership,Inc v Bullock,
No 11-1179, *ii
(US filed Mar 26, 2012).
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free market., 40 Therefore, free market thinkers taught that "[w]e
must choose those [institutions] which minimize the risks of undesirable consequences." 41 In Citizens United, however, the majority considered only one type of risk of undesirable consequences: "Government [that] seeks to use its full power ...to command where a
person may get his or her information or what distrusted 42source he
or she may not hear [] uses censorship to control thought."
The simplistic focus on harm government intervention may
cause is myopic and misleading; 43 it ignores, and thereby increases,
the vulnerability of the government to be used as a tool of pressure
groups. It is a focus on possible risks from one visible entity-the
government-while disregarding the risks from less visible entitiesthe legislative arms of interest groups.

Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place,7 J L & Econ 1, 2 (1964).
Id at 10.
42
Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 908.
43 For an example for this perspective, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 14-15 (1984) (arguing that if we "let some socially undesirable practices
escape, the cost is bearable," while the "costs of deterring beneficial conduct (a byproduct of
any search for the undesirable examples) are high").
40

41
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IFI

The PoliticalProblem. Harper's Weekly, Apr 15, 1876.

III. MIDDLEMEN IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Private lawmakers are middlemen. 44 They operate as the conveyors of ideas from the public to and through legislatures. As mid-

dlemen, private lawmakers owe their existence to imperfections in

44 For a discussion on the economic role of middlemen, see Gary Biglaiser, Middlemen
As Experts, 24 RAND J Econ 212, 216-22 (1993) (arguing that middlemen add value to a market because they are able, by dint of their expertise, to assure buyers that their goods are valuable); Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky, Middlemen, 102 Q J Econ 581, 591-93 (1987).
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the marketplace of ideas,45 such as the costs of communicating information (transaction costs), inadequate information, and bounded
rationality. 46 Put simply, if "the best test of truth [were indeed] the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market," 47 as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote, private
lawmakers would be unemployed.48
In marketplaces of ideas, some private lawmakers compensate
for imperfections, 49 some exploit such imperfections to advance private interests, and others do both-compensate for and take advantage of imperfections.
Unlike apolitical private lawmakers (like the ALI or NCCUSL),
IPLs are in the business of advancing narrow interests. They utilize
imperfections in the marketplace of ideas to do so. This is their expertise, and their performance is measured by delivery of self-serving
laws, such as ALEC's "enactment rate."' In some instances, private
interest may align with broad public interests, but this coincidental
alignment is not the goal of IPLs. Their mission is defined by the private interest.
Some IPLs try to present themselves in a neutral light by
likening themselves to their apolitical relatives. For example, ALEC
explains,
ALEC model bills serve as public policy resources. Many organizations that focus on state-level issues also offer model state
legislation or codes. These organizations include the American
Bar Association, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and [others]. Model bills are ideas that can
be taken, modified or rejected, depending on the needs of a particular legislation. State legislators often find model bills valuable for learning from each others' experiences and expertise,

45 See Jaffe, 51 Harv L Rev at 202 (cited in note 3); Stimson, 5 Annals Am Acad Polit &
Soc Sci at 10-11 (cited in note 3).
46 Correspondingly, regulation is a by-product of imperfections and human limitations.
See generally Barak Orbach, What Is Regulation?, Yale J Reg Online (Oct 10, 2012), online at
http://yale-jreg.org/what-is-regulation/ (visited Dec 18, 2012).
47 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). See also Whitney
v California, 274 US 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis concurring) ("If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
48 See generally Barak Y. Orbach and Frances R. Sjoberg, Excessive Speech, Civility
Norms, and the Clucking Theorem, 44 Conn L Rev 1 (2011); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 S Ct Rev 1; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1.
49 See, for example, W. Brooke Graves, Uniform Regulation and Control of Commerce,
14 Harv Bus Rev 337, 344-45 (1936).
5c 2010 Legislative Scorecard (cited in note 13).
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while tailoring the bills they introduce to meet the interests of
their own state's constituents. Any model bill, regardless of
where it is from, rises or falls in a state based on whether it51provides the solutions that makes sense in that particular state.
But private lawmaking is not all about the creation of "public policy
resources." It also includes advocacy aimed at promoting particular
groups' interests. In the case of IPLs, model bills are drafted to advance a specific interest, and public lawmakers are not left to find
those bills, to exercise their best judgment, or debate the bills.
IV. THE INVISIBLE HAND IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

IPLs make a constant effort to have their invisible hands stirring
in legislative houses. They circumvent the public discourse and
shortcut open debates to advance their goals. IPLs are not interested
in the "free trade in ideas" and work to stifle and cripple such trade.
This is their art.
The Supreme Court's simplistic marketplace of ideas philosophy, however, sweepingly views all market participants, including all
interest groups- and implicitly also IPLs-as deserving of the same
constitutional protection.52 As framed by Justice Holmes, the basis of
this entitlement is the belief that people of
fighting faiths ...may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas [and] that
the best test of truth is the power of the 53thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
The Supreme Court has canonized this conceptual framework 54 and
pressed it further, ruling that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual. 55

51 Frequently Asked Questions (ALEC 2012), online at http://www.alec.org/aboutalec/frequently-asked-questions (visited Dec 18, 2012).
52 See Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 898.
53 Abrams, 250 US at 630 (Holmes dissenting).
54 See, for example, Snyder v Phelps, 131 S Ct 1207, 1220 (2011) ("Speech is powerful. It
can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and ...inflict great
pain.... As a Nation we have chosen.., to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.").
55 FirstNationalBank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 777 (1978). In Citizens United, the

majority rested its reluctance to distinguish between corporations and individuals on the
Court's ruling in Bellotti. See Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 898-900.
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In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy refrained these premises:
"The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use infor-

mation to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment and a necessary means to protect it."5' 6 Therefore, he
concluded that "political speech must prevail against laws that would
suppress it"5' 7 and "the Government may not suppress political

speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity."5 8 Under present law, Congress and states cannot restrict the political speech of
IPLs to limit the reach of their hands, which are invisible to the public.

The Supreme Court's confidence in the efficacy of the marketplace of ideas rests on beliefs in "invisible hand" theories: market
participants supposedly tend to be "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of [their] intention... [and] [b]y pur-

suing [their] own interest [they] frequently promote[] that of the society."5 9 Thus, the invisible hand argument posits that although

market participants use speech rights to promote their own selfinterest, the "ultimate good" may be reached or the "truth" may be
discovered. Invisible hand beliefs are, indeed, popular in the legal
and political discourse. 60 The popularity of these arguments, however, does not cure their fundamental flaws.6 1

The intellectual foundation of invisible hand arguments originates in a misreading of Adam Smith. Smith did not coin the phrase
invisible hand, which was common during his time. 62 Although criti-

56

Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 898.

57 Id.
58

Id at 913.

59 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 477-78
(Chicago 1976).
60 See Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 Va L Rev
1417, 1419-22 (2010).
61 For discussions of market failures due to poor regulation, see National Commission on
the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, The FinancialCrisis Inquiry Report: FinalReport of the NationalCommission on the Causes of the Financialand Economic Crisis in the
United States 52-66
(GPO
Jan
2011), online
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (visited Dec 18, 2012); Carmen
M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of FinancialFolly
277-82 (Princeton 2009); Robert J. Shiller, IrrationalExuberance 2 (Broadway 2d ed 2005). See
also The FinancialCrisis and the Role of FederalRegulators, HearingBefore the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 110th Cong, 2d Sess 16-17
(2008) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve) ("[T]hose of
us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity
(myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.... The whole intellectual edifice ... collapsed.").
62 For example, in the early seventeenth century, William Shakespeare had already used
it in Macbeth.
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cal of government regulation, Smith's invisible hand was the hand of
God, not of market forces.63
Further, established economic theories do not support invisible
hand beliefs.64 Rather, they emphasize market imperfections, such as
externalities, transaction costs, inadequate information, and bounded
rationality. Under any established economic framework, "t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public, 6 depends on the efficiency of idea exchange that, in turn, is
influenced by communication costs, the availability of initial information, rationality, and other factors.66 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has been utilizing an overly simplistic framework of perfect
markets. 67
Indeed, economist Frank Knight, a prominent free market theorist, argued that "trade in ideas" does not really exist:
Genuine, purely intellectual discussion is rare in modem society,
even in intellectual and academic circles, and is approximated
only in very small and essentially casual groups. On the larger
scale, what passes for discussion is mostly argumentation or debate. The intellectual interest is largely subordinate to entertainment, i.e., entertaining and being entertained, or the immediate interest of the active parties centers chiefly in dominance,
victory, instructing others, or persuading rather than convincing,
and not in the impartial quest of truth.68
Knight's observation has abundant empirical support. Studies in psychology show that people tend to interpret information in a manner
63 See Andy Denis, The Invisible Hand of God in Adam Smith, 23 Rsrch Hist Econ
Thought & Methodology 1 (2005); Peter Harrison, Adam Smith and the History of the Invisible
Hand, 72 J Hist Ideas, 29,45 (2011); Alec Macfie, The Invisible Hand of Jupiter, 32 J Hist Ideas

595, 597 (1971).
(4
See generally Steven G. Medema, The Hesitant Hand: Taming Self-Interest in the History of Economic Ideas (Princeton 2009).
65 Bellotti, 435 US at 777 (reasoning used as a rationale in Citizens United).
66 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960):

In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms,
to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly -sufficiently costly at
any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which
the pricing system worked without cost.
67 See Director, 7 J L & Econ at 5-6 (cited in note 40) (explaining the meaning of laissez
faire in the tradition of liberalism and arguing that it is not applicable to speech).
68 Frank H. Knight, Freedom and Reform: Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy
349 (Harper 1947). See generally Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: PsychologicalStudies of Policy
Decisions and Fiascoes (Wadsworth 2d ed 1982) (describing the mechanisms of error in organizations and institutions).
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that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs, and use reasoning to
persuade others, not for the purpose of "trade in ideas." Strong opinions about complex issues tend to exacerbate this tendency and result in biased perceptions of reality and information.69 Under certain
circumstances, debates may reinforce existing beliefs and escalate
polarization. 0 Of course, people regularly overcome disagreements
through exchanges of views and negotiation, but this pattern does
not necessarily establish efficiency in the marketplace of ideas. The
Supreme Court's treatment of the marketplace of ideas utilizes an
outdated economic narrative to justify the Court's traditional treatment. This narrative is not only outdated, but also lacks theoretical
and empirical grounds.
V. MANIPULATIONS AND SPECULATIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS

Using the marketplace narrative, the Supreme Court has developed a few additional principles for the marketplace of ideas. For
example, in New York Times Co v Sullivan,yl the Court declared that

the United States has "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. 7 2 And in Snyder v Phelps,y3 the Court announced, "Speech is
powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and.., inflict great pain.... As a Nation we have cho-

69 See, for example, Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J Personality & Soc Psych 2098, 2104 (1979).
70 See James Andreoni and Tymofiy Mylovanov, Diverging Opinions, 4 Am Econ J: Microeconomics 209, 213 (Feb 2012) ("[A]rrival of public information can cause divergence of
opinions."). For scholarly discussion on the self-serving bias, the pattern of adhering to existing
beliefs, and polarization, see Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal
Motivation, 117 Q J Econ 871, 901-02 (2002) (explaining the empirical fact that people are often unfoundedly self-confident by arguing that even unfounded self-confidence might be personally valuable); Avinash K. Dixit and Jbrgen W. Weibull, Political Polarization,104 Proc
Natl Acad Sci 7351, 7354 (2007); Barak Orbach, On Hubris, Civility, and Incivility, 54 Ariz L
Rev 443,456 (2012) (arguing that the cognitive biases may form polarizing civility and incivility
norms); Orbach and Sjoberg, 44 Conn L Rev at 6 (cited in note 48); Rajiv Sethi and Muhamet
Yildiz, Public Disagreement, 4 Am Econ J: Microeconomics 57, 76 (Aug 2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide 14-15 (Oxford 2009) (discussing
an experiment in which the attitudes of jurors toward the proper severity of punishment were
further polarized after deliberation).
71 376 US 254 (1964).
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sen ... to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that
74

we do not stifle public debate.,

Speech is indeed powerful. Alongside its undeniable beneficial
virtues, speech7 may also be used to stifle public debate and adversely
affect society.
Middlemen, including private lawmakers, operate in the marketplace in many ways, and one may argue they are "led by an invis'
ible hand to promote an end which [is] no part of [their] intention. 76
They may indeed compensate for existing market inefficiencies by
facilitating exchanges. But middlemen can also utilize their position
to advance their self-interest by profitably speculating or manipulating information at the expense of others. 77 The marketplace of ideas
hypothesis suggests that if profitable manipulations (or speculations)
ever take place they stabilize prices, namely, by revealing the truth
or preferences in the market. John Stuart Mill, Milton Friedman, and
other economists presented this thesis to argue that financial speculations may cause transitory effects in the short term but stabilize
prices in the long term. 78 The Supreme Court took this approach to

the extreme, arguing that the pain speech may cause is temporary
and local, while the inherent value of speech contributes to the public debate. In other words, the premise regarding the "inherent worth
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public, 79 is
equivalent to an unqualified assumption about an inherent value of
stock transactions, including insider trading and stock price manipulation. Applying this logic, under the rationale of Citizens United, the
restrictions imposed on stock traders should not be greater than
those imposed on the public.
The economic argument about speculations and manipulations
is theoretically flawed and is inconsistent with financial realities. 80 In
Id at 1220.
See Orbach and Sjoberg, 44 Conn L Rev at 5 (cited in note 48).
76 Smith, The Wealth of Nations at 477 (cited in note 59).
77 See generally Jos Van Bommel, Rumors, 58 J Fin 1499 (2003) (explaining how rumors
cause speculation through the asymmetry and uncertainty of information they create); Daniel
R. Fischel and David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in FinancialMarkets?,
105 Harv L Rev 503 (1991) (arguing that manipulative-or speculative -trades should not be
prohibited because they may not be socially undesirable); Oliver D. Hart, On the Profitability
of Speculation, 91 Q J Econ 579 (1977) (examining the conditions under which speculation is
beneficial to society).
78 See Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Speculation Relating Profitability and Stability, 41
Rev Econ & Stat 295, 297-99 (1959); Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 157-203
(Chicago 1953); John Stuart Mill, 2 Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy 267-70 (Parker 3d ed 1852).
79 Bellotti, 435 US at 777.
80 See generally M.J. Farrell, Profitable Speculation, 33 Economica 183 (1966); Oliver D.
Hart and David M. Kreps, Price DestabilizingSpeculation, 94 J Polit Econ 927 (1986).
74
75
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essence, the argument suggests that middlemen have no role in the
facilitation of financial bubbles. Like other middlemen who can utilize their position for profitable speculations and manipulations,
IPLs' position allows them to use political speech to discipline public
lawmakers who do not endorse their proposals and to reward obedient public lawmakers. They can increase their enactment rate with
political speech. By unleashing the political speech of interest
groups, Citizens United effectively armed IPLs and contributed to
their effectiveness.
VI. THE FALLACY OF THE BELIEF IN EFFICIENT MARKETS
Interested private lawmaking, albeit an ordinary strategy of interest groups, is relatively invisible. Occasionally, it becomes the target of media scrutiny, but overall courts and scholars pay little attention to the topic despite its significance. This inattention is only one
dimension of invisibility. Interested private lawmaking is invisible also because of the presumption that public lawmakers draft or, at the
very least, deliberate, every legislative proposal. 81 The public does
not know much about IPLs and their activities. The public cannot
throw IPLs out of office, and throwing public lawmakers out of office for adopting IPLs' bills may only be a temporary setback to
IPLs. For IPLs, public lawmakers are dispensable pawns.
It is often argued that "regulation is acquired by the industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit., 82 Capture
theories are one source of critique of regulation.83 Critique and distrust of regulation and government have led the Supreme Court to
impose restrictions on the government power to regulate private parties that seek to influence the government. In effect, in Citizens United and A TP, the Court strengthened the capture IPLs have over
public lawmakers, relying on the theory that speech serves as a
"means to hold officials accountable to the people. ' 84 In the marketplace of ideas, unleashed interest groups may have effective means

81 See, for example, NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2579 (Roberts) ("[P]olicy judgments ... are entrusted to our ... elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with
them.").
82 Stigler, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci at 5 (cited in note 9). See also Gabriel Kolko, The
Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 3 (Free Press
1963) (studying the establishment of the ICC and its early years and concluding that "regulation itself was invariably controlled by leaders of the regulated industry, and directed toward
ends they deemed acceptable or desirable"); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211, 213-22 (1976).
83 See, for example, Orbach, What Is Regulation? 5-6 (cited in note 46).
84
Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 898.
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to influence public lawmakers to be accountable to their people at
the expense of the people.
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